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1  Introduction 
 
 In ―The Trouble With Physics‖, Lee Smolin recounts the philosophical 
dilemmas of modern physical systems theory. [1]  It is easy enough to paraphrase 
Smolin when illustrating the breakdown of classical physical systems concepts and 
the incomplete picture of knowledge (indeed the necessarily incomplete picture for 
those who know their Gödel).  Any observer of modern physics can see there are 
several areas where the theory must either cohere or perhaps be rejected and replaced 
(in the long run if not the short.)  This is not to argue in favor of ―crackpot‖ radical 
schemes or to suddenly reject the advances which general relativity and quantum 
mechanics have made in resolving problems which classical methods failed to solve.  
Nonetheless, physics is in deep philosophical and theoretical difficulty today, 
especially in its more esoteric branches.  This is rather evident if one simply skates 
across Stuart Kauffman‘s ―boundary between order and chaos‖ [2] to survey where 
physical theory begins to break down. 
 For example, Newtonian kinematics runs into trouble with three bodies as 
Poincaré explained in pioneering what became chaos theory, even though for two 
bodies we get lovely Keplerian dynamics (as Feynman gave in his original 
elementary exposition).[3]  General Relativity runs into trouble with one body at two 
scales: (a) Very small bodies, length near or less than a Planck length, and totally 
breaking down as length approaches zero;  as well as (b) the universe(s) as a whole.  
Likewise, Quantum Field Theory also has trouble with one body, as it interacts with 
its own field, in a way which requires renormalization.  String Theory runs into 
trouble with zero bodies, as it predicts 10500 or 101000 different vacuums, of which we 
don't know which one we ever had.  
 In this paper we will review the ―measurement‖ problem in quantum mechanics, 
following our earlier paper, ―The Fundamental Importance of Discourse in 
Theoretical Physics‖ [4], and paying especial attention to the arguments of John S. 
Bell, particularly those dealing with Bohr‘s ―debate‖ with Einstein on the language 
and meaning of quantum mechanics.  From there we will enter into a more technical 
treatment of non-locality as well as demonstrating that even where quantum 
mechanics is deterministic, this is not an ontological necessity. 
 
1.1 Quantum Mechanics – Interpretations and Non-locality 
 
 John Bell gives a wonderful summary of the role of discourse in theoretical 
physics and the difficulties of coming to grips with it in his 1984 paper, 
―Bertlmann‘s Socks and the Nature of Reality‖[5], beginning with Einstein‘s 
argument that: 
 
 If one asks what, irrespective of quantum mechanics, is 
characteristic of the world of  ideas of physics, one is first of all 
struck by the following:  the concepts of physics relate to a real 
outside world…It is further characteristic of these physical objects 
that they are thought of as arranged in a space-time continuum.  An 
  
essential aspect of this arrangement of things in physics is that they 
lay claim, at a certain time, to an existence independent of one 
another, provided these objects ‗are situated in different parts of 
space. 
 
 This is essentially the philosophical position advocated by Ludwig Wittgenstein 
in the ―Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus‖[6].  Even without the benefit of subsequent 
arguments,  including those by Wittgenstein himself, who ultimately rejected this 
viewpoint, [7].  Bell gives us Einstein‘s own qualification from quantum mechanics: 
 
―There seems to me no doubt that those physicists who regard the 
descriptive method of quantum mechanics as definitive in principle 
would react to this line of thought in the following way: they 
would drop the requirement…for the independent existence of the 
physical reality present in different parts of space; they would be 
justified in pointing out that the quantum theory nowhere makes 
explicit use of this requirement.‖ 
 
 Einstein then goes on to complete the argument by explaining that he 
nonetheless sees no reason why this requirement would necessarily have to be 
abandoned and that this was why he believed quantum mechanics to be an 
incomplete theory.  What is noteworthy in regard to Bell‘s raising this argument is 
that the contemporary discourse of the opposing school of thought is even less 
satisfying than the explanation provided by Einstein.  Bell‘s argument begins with 
the problematical position of Bohr. ―Bohr once declared when asked whether the 
quantum mechanical algorithm could be considered as somehow mirroring an 
underlying quantum reality: ‗There is no quantum world.  There is only an abstract 
quantum mechanical description.  It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to 
find out how Nature is.  Physics concerns what we can say about nature.‖  Not only 
is this bad philosophical discourse, but it is bad physics.  Bell illustrates the scope of 
Bohr‘s problem by noting that: 
 
 While imagining that I understand the position of Einstein as 
regards EPR correlations, I have very little understanding of his 
principal opponent, Bohr.  Yet most contemporary theorists have 
the impression that Bohr got the better of Einstein in the argument 
and are under the impression that they themselves share Bohr‘s 
views.  As an indication of those views, I quote a passage from his 
reply to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen.  It is a passage which Bohr 
himself seems to have regarded as definitive, quoting it himself 
when summing up much later.  Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen had 
assumed that ‗…if, without in any way disturbing a system, we can 
predict with certainty the value of a physical quantity, then there 
exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical 
quantity‘.  Bohr replied: ‗…the wording of the above mentioned 
criterion…contains an ambiguity as regards the meaning of the 
expression ‗without in any way disturbing a system‘.  Of course 
there is in a case like that just considered no question of 
mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation during 
the last critical stages of the measuring procedure.  But even at this 
stage there is essentially the question of an influence on the very 
conditions which define the possible types of predictions regarding 
the future behavior of the system…their argumentation does not 
justify their conclusion that quantum mechanical description is 
essentially incomplete…this description may be characterized as 
the rational utilization of all possibilities of unambiguous 
  
interpretation of measurements, compatible with the finite and 
uncontrollable action between the objects and the measuring 
instruments in the field of quantum theory‘ 
 
Finally, Bell explains why this is both bad philosophy and bad physics: 
 
 Indeed, I have very little idea what this means.  I do not 
understand in what sense the word ‗mechanical‘ is used, in 
characterizing the disturbances which Bohr does not contemplate, 
as distinct from those which he does.  I do not know what the 
italicized passage means – ―an influence on the very conditions…‖  
Could it mean just that different experiments on the first system 
give different kinds of information about the second?  But this was 
just one of the main points of EPR, who observed that one could 
learn either the position or the momentum of the second system.  
And then I do not understand the final reference to ‗uncontrollable 
interactions between measuring instruments and objects.‘  It seems 
just to ignore the essential point of EPR that in the absence of 
action at a distance, only the first system could be supposedly 
disturbed by the first measurement and yet definite predictions 
become possible for the second system.  Is Bohr just rejecting the 
premise  - ―no action at a distance‖ – rather than refuting the 
argument? 
 
 Indeed, it does appear that Bohr simply rejects non-locality, and as our 
subsequent analysis shows, this is both mathematically and empirically bad science.  
While we do not pretend to have the complete philosophical position necessary to 
accommodate all the various aspects of non-locality, we do have some clear notions 
of what physics tells us about non-locality, and how we can understand the 
foundations of non-local interactions without resorting to such cumbersome concepts 
as ―non-reality‖. 
 
2.1  Non-Locality 
 
 Here we recapitulate our arguments on non-locality from ―Time, Uncertainty 
and Non-Locality in Quantum Cosmology‖ [8].  We begin with the Schrödinger 
wave equation and continue through an exposition of non-locality in detail, covering 
quantum entanglement and the Stern-Gerlach apparatus (which for the purposes of 
our discussion directly addresses the issue of the ―quantum system‖ and the quantum 
problem of measurement), including a brief discussion of quantum mechanical 
determinism and ontological necessity. 
 
 
 
 
3.1  The Schrodinger Wave Equation 
 
 Wave functions live on configuration space. Schrödinger called this 
entanglement. The linearity of the Schrödinger equation prevents the wave function 
from representing reality. If the equation were non-linear (e.g. reduction models) the 
wave function living on configuration space still could not by itself represent reality 
in physical space.[5]  Given a system that can be described by linear combinations of 
wave functions 
1
  and 2 . We also have a piece of apparatus that, when brought 
into interaction with the system, measures whether the system has wave function 
1
  
  
and
2 . Measuring means that, next to the 0 pointer position, the apparatus has two 
pointer positions, 1 and 2, 'described' by the wave functions 0 , 1 , 2  for which 
0 , 1,2
Schrodinger evolution
i i i i      
 
The wave function has a support in configuration space which corresponds 
classically to a set of coordinates of particles (which would form a pointer).  For 
superposition: 
2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2, , , 1c c c c c c        
 
0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( )
Schrodinger evolution
i c c c c            
 
The outcome on the right side does not concur with experience. It shows a 
‗macroscopic indeterminacy‘. For the Schrödinger cat experiment 1 and 2  are the 
wave functions of the non-decayed and the decayed atom; 0 and 1  are the wave 
functions for the live cat and 2  is the wave function for the dead cat. Schrödinger 
says that this is unacceptable. Why? Isn‘t the apparatus supposed to be the observer? 
What counts as an observer? 
 
 The evolution of 
0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( )
Schrodinger evolution
i c c c c            is an instance 
of decoherence. The apparatus decoheres the superposition 
1 1 2 2( )c c  of the 
system wave function. Decoherence means that it is in a practical sense impossible to 
get the two wave packets 1 1  and 1 2  superimposed in 1 1 1 2 2 2c c    to 
interfere. Decomposition is this practical impossibility – Bell referred this as ‗fapp-
impossibility‘ where fapp =  for all practical purposes.[7] 
 
 
3.2  Mechanics and the Double-Slit Experiment 
 
 
 Particle motion is guided by the wave function. The physical theory is 
formulated with the variables 
3, 1,2,3,...i i N q , the positions of the N 
particles that make up the system, and the wave function 1( ,.... )N q q on the 
configuration space of the system.  Quantum randomness – Born‘s statistical law – is 
explained on the basis of Bolzmann‘s principles of statistical mechanics. Born‘s law 
is not an axiom but a theorem; Born‘s statistical law concerning  
2
  is that if 
the wave function is   then the particle configuration is 
2
 -distributed. Applying 
this to  0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( )
Schrodinger evolution
i c c c c           above 
implies that the result i comes with probability 
2
ic .  
  
  
 In the double slit experiment, each particle goes either through the upper or 
through the lower slit. The wave function goes through both slits and forms after the 
slits a wave function with an interference pattern: 
 
(A)  Close slit 1 open slit 2; Particle goes through slit 2; It arrives at  on the 
plate with probability  
2
2 ( ) x  
Where 2  is the wave function which passed though slit 2. 
 
 
(B)  Close slit 2 open slit 1;  Particle goes through slit 1.  It arrives at x on the 
plate with probability 
2
1( ) x  
Where 1 is the wave function which passed though slit 1. 
 
(C)  Both slits are open;  The particle goes through slit 1 or slit 2.  It arrives at 
x on the plate with probability 
2 2
1 2( ) ( ) x x  
 
In general: 
 
2 2 2 2 2*
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )             x x x x x x x x
 
 
Here  denotes the real part of a complex quantity. The inequality comes from the 
interference of the wave packets 1 2,  which passes through slit 1 and 2. 
Situations ‗Particle goes through slit 2‘ and ‗Particle goes through slit 1‘  are 
exclusive alternatives entering ‗The particle goes through slit 1 or slit 2‘, but the 
probabilities 
2
2 ( ) x and 
2
1( ) x do not add up – this is because ‗Close slit 1 open 
slit 2‘, Close slit 1 open slit 1‘ and ‗Both slits are open‘ are physically distinct. 
 
 
4.1  Causality, Determinism and Ontology 
 
 This type of methodology is often said to aim at restoring determinism to the 
quantum world. Determinism has nothing to do with ontology. This type of QM is 
deterministic - but is not an ontological necessity. In this regard, our position 
(derived from relatively straightforward Bohmian mechanics) is rather different than 
that of T‘Hooft [14], particularly in ―Quantum Mechanics and Determinism‘, where 
the effort is directed at mapping the quantum states of a system of free scalar 
particles one-to-one onto the states of a completely deterministic model.  T‘Hooft 
has several schema of this type, including mappings applied to free Maxwell fields 
and demonstrating Lorentz invariance. [15][16] This is not to deny that T‘Hooft has 
demonstrated some brilliant insights into the epistemological nature of quantum 
mechanics and quantum field theory.  He certainly argues with great plausibility that 
string theory cannot fulfill the role of the standard model for quantum field theory.1 
[16] 
                                               
1
 Specifically, ―For the last couple of decades, theoreticians have been considering the challenge to 
include the one remaining theoretical requirement: general relativity, i.e., the laws of gravity. The problem 
appears to be a beautiful one, since now the dynamics of the curvature in space and time must be 
submitted to the laws of quantum mechanics. The virtual contributions to the amplitudes due to space-time 
curvature diverge at the small-distance end, just like Fermi‘s earliest models for the weak force used to do. 
  
 However, by his own admission, while he finds merit in approaching dynamics 
below the Planck scale as being so complex that they lead to apparently stochastic 
fluctuations (a phenomenon well known in non-linear dynamical systems modeling) 
that he models the system with a first order perturbative theory, even though this 
type of theory leads to the EPR paradox and Bell‘s inequalities.  Part of our difficulty 
with T‘Hooft‘s approach is that in this kind of method, ―…the definition of time does 
not need to be very strict.  One might have a continuous time variable or discretized 
time, or time might be defined in terms of Cauchy surfaces in a general relativistic 
setting.  There is one important condition that must be met by the time variable, 
however: it must be on a real line (possibly with a beginning and an end to it).  Time 
is not allowed to be cyclic.  If closed time-like trajectories would exist, this would 
lead to clashes and our theory would no longer be unambiguous.  Closed time-like 
loops, popular in some versions of gravity theories, will no longer be excluded.‖[16] 
 However it is precisely the role of time which has been the focus of our 
investigations in quantum cosmology. [8][17][18][19][20][21][22]. In this regard, the 
time function is critically important and our interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
and indeed quantum cosmology necessarily precludes a flow of static infinitesimals, 
prohibits discretization and does not prohibit global cyclicality [22].   Although we 
have not fully explored the mathematical and topological landscape of closed 
timelike geodesics, there is at present, nothing in our proposed theory which 
categorically rules out the existence of closed time-like trajectories. [18]  
Additionally, T‘Hooft must introduce a number of complex constraints which limit 
the observables of his theory, particularly when he must deal with non-locality.[14]  
In contradistinction, we are able to relate observables and even the characterization 
of the observational apparatus directly to non-locality. 
 
4.2 Locality 
 
 As we argued in a previous exposition [8], Einstein deduced from Maxwell‘s 
equations that space and time change in a different way from Galilean physics when 
one changes between frames moving with respect to each other. The nature of this 
change is governed by the unchanging velocity of light when moving from one frame 
to another. This led to Minkowski showing that a particle needs a position in time 
and space for its specification therefore implying that a particle in relativistic space 
should have time and space coordinates.  
 In this section, we explore the argument that any theory must be nonlocal and 
attempt to present a mathematical proof to that effect. Nonlocality is crudely defined 
as meaning that the theory contains action at a distance in the true meaning of the 
words i.e. faster than light action between separated events. 
 Action at a distance is such that no information can be sent with superluminal 
speed – therefore, there is no inconsistency with special relativity. Nonlocality is 
encoded in the wave function that lives on configuration space and is by its very 
nature a nonlocal agent. All particles are guided simultaneously by the wave function 
                                                                                                               
In the latter case, the divergences were successfully tamed by the introduction of the Standard Model. 
Naturally, one expects similar solutions to the problem at hand, and indeed, string theories and their 
successors are claimed to come close to bringing just such a solution.  But, they have not done so yet, and 
upon closer inspection one finds that there really are reasons to be skeptical. Not only are there numerous 
technical difficulties — the identification of the ground state, our lack of understanding the 
supersymmetry breaking mechanism, the smallness of the cosmological constant —,there are also more 
fundamental ones, which are difficulties that have little to do with the fact that we are dealing with strings, 
D-branes, or what not. Rather, they have to do with the fact that we are attempting to apply quantum 
mechanics to dynamical laws that should be the ultimate driving forces of the entire Universe; one will be 
forced to consider statistical ensembles of universes, and such notions will be much more questionable 
than the notion of an ensemble of experiments inside one universe. It should be kept in mind that one will 
never be able to do experiments in more than one universe, and that the ‗averaged value‘ of a quantity 
measured in different universes cannot be checked against any theory. 
  
and f the wave function is entangled, the nonlocal action does not get small with 
particles. 
 In a two particle system with coordinates 
1 2( ), ( )t tX X  we have: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore the velocity of 1( )tX at time t depends in general on 2( )tX at time t, no 
matter how far apart the positions are. In general here means that the wave function 
is entangled and not a product e.g.:   (x,y) = (x) (y) . However, there is no 
immediate reason why the wave function should become a product when x and y are 
far apart (although decoherence is always lurking awaiting an opportunity to destroy 
coherence i.e. produce an effective product structure).  This exposition in expanded 
upon in Appendix I, ―Bell‘s Theorem‖. 
 
 
  
  
1
2
( )
1
1 1 2
( , ( ))
( )
( ( ), ( ))
t
t
t
m t t



  
 
  
 
 
 
x X
x X
x
X
X X
  
5.1 Statistical Ontology, Non-Locality and “The Apparatus” 
 
 Justification for Born‘s statistical interpretation of the wave function is based 
upon typicality arguments. This gives a hypothesis for quantum equilibrium. If a 
subsystem has effective wave function   then its particle coordinates are
2
  
distributed. Proof of this hypothesis entails a proof of the law of large numbers. If we 
return to the Stern-Gerlach magnets as in our previous examples, from our previous 
references [21][22][23][24][25] and Dürr, Goldsteinand Zanghì (1992)[27], we need 
to demonstrate that there is no effect on the statistics of outcomes; they are the same 
whether we take a measurement on the magnet on the left, or a measurement on the 
magnet on the right, first.  
 
Take a general entangled two-particle state: 
 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
a b c d              
 
with 
2 2 2 2
1a b c d    . 
  
The probability of getting the spin value 
2
  at the right magnet is 
2 2
b d  . 
Now undertake a measurement at the left magnet in an arbitrary direction  , where  
  is the angle between the chosen direction and the z-direction. We can now write 
the entangled equation in the  -basis: 
 
1
1
cos sini   i j  and 1
1
sin cosi    i j  
 
We can rewrite the state   as: 
 
1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
cos ( sin ( sin ( cos (a d b c a d b c                      
   
i j
 
1 1
  i j  
 
Therefore 
1
2
 i and 1
2
 j are the probabilities for the outcomes spin up or spin 
down when measuring first at the left magnet at an arbitrary angle  . Therefore the 
collapsed wave function will either be 1
1


i
i
or 1
1


j
j
depending upon the outcome 
at the left hand magnet. 
 
The effect of this measurement on the probability for the outcome at the right magnet 
is as follows.  
 
Calculating the equilibrium probability for the spin up wave function 
2
 , for the 
collapsed wave function 1
1


i
i
 , we obtain the probability: 
  
 
1
2
1
2
2
( cos sin )d b 

 
i
i
 
 
 
And for 1
1


j
j
, we obtain: 
 
1
2
1
2
2
( cos sin )b d 

 
j
j
 
 
The outcome for the spin up case for the right hand magnet is therefore: 
 
1 1
1 1
2 2
2 21 1 2 22 2
2 2
( cos sin ) ( cos sin )d b b d
b d
   
 
 
   
  i j
i j
i j
 
 
 
Therefore the ‗statistical‘ outcomes are the same no matter if the measurement takes 
place on the left or right hand magnet. 
 
 
6   Conclusion 
 
 The role and nature of determinism in quantum mechanics is complex, and is 
hardly a closed question.  On the one hand, T‘Hooft has contributed important 
elements of an emerging framework for deterministic quantum mechanics (within 
the framework of quantum-mechanical probability distributions, or what F.S.C. 
Northrop refers to as ―theoretical probability‖).  On the other hand, the ability of a 
pseudo-classical stochastic perturbative process to accurately model Planck scale 
behavior in a fine-grained fashion has yet to be established.  More comprehensively, 
outside of invoking decoherence, non-locality appears to be key component of any 
quantum mechanics, much as many authors would like to find a way around it.  Time 
too has a role in this model, not as an independent physical variable, so much as the 
preserver of continuity in nature.  Different approaches to time yield very different 
models of quantum mechanical behavior and appear to have a fundamental role in 
quantum cosmology. 
  
  
Appendix I:  Bell’s Theorem2 
 
 Is it possible to describe a quantum mechanics that is local?  Einstein, Podoloski 
and Rosen (EPR) thought so. The EPR argument is interesting as it constitutes part 
of Bell‘s proof of the Nonlocality of nature. Bell‘s response is Bell‘s theorem (i.e., 
nature is nonlocal). 
 In this first part of the argument on Bell‘s Theorem, the EPR argument applied 
to a simplified EPR Gedanken experiment. This approach is based upon the 
argument that one can prepare a special pair (L, R) of spin ½ particles that fly apart 
in opposite directions and which behave in the following well determined fashion. 
  When both particles pass identically oriented Stern-Gerlach magnets, they 
deflect in exactly opposite direction. If L has a-spin +1/2 then R has a-spin -1/2 
where a is the orientation of the magnets. This is true for all directions a. The 
probability for L up, R down is ½. The two particle wave function is called a singlet 
state and the total spin of this singlet state is zero. Measuring first the a-spin on L, 
we can predict with certainty the result of the measurement of the a-spin on R. This 
is true even of the measurement events L and R are space-like separated.  
 Suppose that the experiment is arranged in such a way that a light signal cannot 
communicate the L result to the R particle before the R particle passes SGM-R. 
Suppose now that ‗locality‘ holds meaning that the spin measurement on one side 
has no superluminal influence on the result of the spin measurement on the other 
side. Then we must conclude that the value we predict for the a-spin on R is pre-
existing. It cannot have been created by the result obtained on L as we assume 
locality. If the value pre-exists, then that means that it exists even before the decision 
was taken in which direction a the spin on the left is to be measured. The value 
therefore pre-exists for any direction a. This also holds (by symmetry) for the values 
obtained on L. by locality, therefore we obtain the pre-existing values of spins on 
either side in any direction.  
 We collect the pre-existing values in a family of variables  ( ), 1,1L R  ( )a aX X
with a indexing arbitrary directions and with 
( )L R( )a aX X .   The locality check is 
now to ask the question if such pre-existing values actually exist. However, there is 
no way that the variables can reproduce the quantum mechanical correlations. 
Choose three directions, given by unit vectors a, b, and c and consider the 
corresponding 6 variables: 
 
 ( ), , , , ,L R ( )y zX X y z a b c .    They must satisfy:  
   ( ) ( ) ( ) (R) ( ) (R), , , ,L L L R   a b c a b cX X X X X X
 
 
We wish to reproduce the relative frequencies of the anticorrelation events: 
 
( ) (R) ( ) (R) ( ) (R)= , = , =L L L  a b b c c aX X X X X X  
 
Adding the probabilities and using the rules of probability, we get: 
 
     ( ) (R) ( ) (R) ( ) (R)Prob = Prob = Prob =L L L    a b b c c aX X X X X X
 
                                               
2
  Abstracted from Passman, Maurice, Fellman, Philip V., and Post, Jonathan Vos (2011) Time, 
Uncertainty and Non-Locality in Quantum Cosmology, paper presented at the 8
th
 International Conference 
on Complex Systems, Quincy, MA June 26-July 1, 2011. 
 
  
 
     ( ) (L) ( ) (L) ( ) (L)a b b c c a= Prob X = X Prob X = X Prob X = XL L L   
 ( ) (L) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a b b c c aProb X = X or X = X or X = XL L L L L  
= Prob (sure event) = 1, as  , , , , ,i i L R ( )yX y a b c can only take two values. 
This is therefore one version of Bell‘s inequality: 
     ( ) (R) ( ) (R) ( ) (R)Prob = Prob = Prob = 1L L L     a b b c c aX X X X X X
 
 
The logical structure of Bell‘s nonlocality argument follows.  
 
Let P be the hypothesis of the existence of pre-existing values  
 
,
, ,
L RX a b c for the spin components relevant to this EPRB experiment. Then: 
 
First part: quantum mechanics + locality -> P 
 
Second part: quantum mechanics-> not P 
 
Conclusion: quantum mechanics -> nonlocality 
 
     ( ) (R) ( ) (R) ( ) (R)Prob = Prob = Prob = 1L L L     a b b c c aX X X X X X
is violated by experimental evidence (Aspect et Al, 1982a, 1982b). [25][26] 
 
We could therefore write: 
Bell‘s Theorem - First part: experimental facts + locality -> P 
Bell‘s Theorem - Second part: experimental facts -> not P 
Conclusion: experimental facts -> nonlocality 
Nature is therefore nonlocal. QED! 
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